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Abstract
In 2011, a series of physician strikes in Israel followed eight months of unsuccessful negotiations with the
government (Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance). Strikes by physicians may be a warning that all is not
well in a health system and protestors have claimed that they signify a system failure. In contrast, others argue that
strikes have been a feature of the Israeli health system from its inception and should not be a cause for alarm. This
paper analyses the Israeli health system from the perspective of the strikers' demands using the World Health
Organisation’s six health system building blocks as a framework, including: service delivery; health workforce;
information; medical products, vaccines and technologies; leadership and governance; and financing. While we
recognise that the immediate causes of the 2011 strikes were concerns about salaries and working conditions, we
argue that a complex set of interacting factors underlie the strikers' demands, resonating with issues relating to five
of the WHO building blocks. We argue that of the five, three are most significant and limit progress with all the
others: a disgruntled health workforce, many of whom believe that striking is the only way to be heard; a lack of
leadership by the government in understanding and responding to physicians' concerns; and a purported
information insufficiency, manifest as a lack of critique and analysis that may have prevented those at the top from
making a reliable diagnosis of the system’s problems. This paper argues that there are cracks within the Israeli
health system but that these are not irresolvable. The Israeli health system is a relatively new and popular health
system, but there are no grounds for complacency.
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Introduction
Between April and November in 2011 a series of partial
strikes were initiated by Israeli physicians, mainly involv-
ing those working in hospitals. These strikes, the longest
running in Israel’s history [1], followed eight months of
unsuccessful negotiations with the government (Ministry
of Health and the Ministry of Finance).
In brief, the Israel Medical Association (IMA) - the
professional association of Israeli physicians - demanded
increased hospital capacity, employment of an extra
1,000 doctors, that salaries be doubled, that those work-
ing in remote areas and in unpopular specialties receive
higher pay, and that doctors’ hours be reduced. Doctors
also demanded that an increased share of their wages be
used as a basis for their employers' contributions to their
pensions and that there should be an increased time allo-
cation for each health clinic consultation, from 10 to 12–
15 minutes [2-4]. In the background to the strike there
was also a demand to allow private practice in public hos-
pitals. This was a partial, rather than a full strike as not all
doctors were involved and many of those involved contin-
ued to work part of the time. A deal, agreed with the
Ministry of Finance in August 2011, fulfilled part of the
IMA’s requests but there was a second wave of resigna-
tions and rallies in August-November, with protestors
accusing the IMA of having ‘sold out’ [4,5].
Physician strikes in Israel are not new and there have
been many in its short history, in 1973, 1976, 1983,
1987, 1988–1990 (intermittent), 1999 and 2000 [6]; we
have summarised the main features of these in Table 1.
The new strike was a departure from the recent past. A
10-year agreement reached in 2000 ushered in over a
decade of industrial peace but, once it expired, industrial
action soon ensued. So what has happened to fracture
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this peace? Are these recent strikes simply a manifest-
ation of a disagreement over what constitutes a fair and
appropriate level of income for doctors? Are strikes now
part of established Israeli medical culture? Or do they
represent something deeper; a symptom of emerging
cracks within the health system?
This paper examines the last of these questions but, to
do so, it must first ask why the strikes occurred, describe
the functions of a health system, evaluate how the Israeli
system undertakes these functions, and whether it has
succeeded or failed in doing so with particular reference
to the complaints of those striking.
Table 1 Summary of features of the main physician strikes in Israel from1976-2000
Strike Strike
duration
Actions taken Most important proximate
cause of the strike
The main outcomes
1976 58 days [7] • Closure of hospital outpatient clinics • On-call payments to physicians • 2.5% Salary increase
• Revision of salary supplements• Only urgent surgical procedures • Time off after being on-duty
• Revision of on-duty and on-call
payments
• No patient discharges • Full implementation of the
previous physician agreement
• A change in the promotion system
and shortening of the promotion
period
• A study fund for physicians
• Opposition to moves to reduce
physician numbers
1983 117 Days [7] • 90% of doctors on strike [8] • Additional physician posts • A payment mechanism for working
overtime [7]
• Doubling of salaries• Most hospitals operated on a “weekend basis”
over a 4 month period [6] • Restriction both of working
hours and consecutive hours
worked [7]
• Supplemental payment to doctors for
hospital work [7]
• Supplemental payment to interns:
10% of a doctors salary [7]
• Ended with a hunger strike and mass hospital
exodus [6]
• ‘Many believe that the strike also
damaged public trust in the physicians
and their representatives’. ([6] p66)
1994 I day [7] • 24 hour ‘warming strike’ by 12,000 doctors
including those from public sector hospitals, health
centres and community health fund clinics [9]
• Increased doctors salaries [7] • New promotion grades
• Increased salary supplements
• Determining a payment rate for
on-calls
• Increased numbers of doctors
making it difficult to find work
[9]
• Days off after on calls and study leave
• A new system for further medical
studies
• Many elective operations and outpatient
appointments were cancelled [9]
• A professional advancement
mechanism
• Recognition of the physician as a top
specialist [7]
• Only emergency services were operating [9]
2000 217 days [7] • ‘General strikes, disruptions and various
sanctions’. [7]
• Salary improvement [6,7] • A 13.2% salary increase for doctors [7]
• A remuneration mechanism for
further study and absences [7]
• Limitation on consecutive hours that
interns and residents work
• Limits on consecutive hours
worked [6]
• Increase in the fixed salary portion of
earnings from 35% to 50% [7]
• The right to private practice in
public hospitals [6]
• Extension of the physician pension
coverage [7]
• Study leave entitlement [7]• Recognition of out-of hours
rotations and on-call duty as
part of base pay calculations [6]
• Establishment of a public commission
to examine the public health system
and physicians’ status [6,7]• Higher funding and
strengthening of the public
health system [6]
• Agreement by the IMA not to strike
for a decade [6]
• Both sides agreed to arbitration for
unresolved issues [6]
Sources: Heath System Review, the IMA position papers, the Journal of Medical Ethics, the British Medical Journal [6,7,8,9].
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Methods
The paper uses mixed methods, with a narrative review
of the limited material published including academic
and professional literature, media coverage and websites
(such as that developed by the Israeli Medical Associ-
ation) supplemented by interviews with key informants.
The search of electronic databases for the review of the
academic literature used the MeSH terms ‘Israel’,
‘Strikes, Employee’ and ‘Physicians’ with exploding of the
term ‘Physicians’ in MEDLINE and Embase subject
headings ‘Israel’, ’trade union’ and exploding of the term
‘physician’. A key word search was used in Web of Sci-
ence: ‘Israel* AND (strike* or ‘industrial action’) AND
(physician* or doctor* or general practi*)’. These yielded
23 results on MEDLINE, 12 results in Embase and 25
results in Web of Science on April 5th, 2013. Most of
these articles focussed on the morality of striking and
consequences for health outcomes rather than an in-
depth examination of their causes. Despite a thorough
search, no related academic papers written in Hebrew
were identified.
Informants were selected purposively to include hos-
pital management, practicing clinicians, the Israeli Med-
ical Association, academics researching health policy,
and the mass media. Eight formal interviews were
conducted. The formal interviews were held between
April 2012-October 2012 and subjects included the dir-
ector of a large medical centre, a former deputy director
a general hospital and senior official in the Ministry of
Health’s Medical Division, a senior public health aca-
demic, for a senior official at the Israel Medical Associ-
ation, a dean of a medical school, a leading health
researcher at a think tank, and a leading health journal-
ist. None of those interviewed were directly involved
with the negotiations.
An interview guide was used, with ten opening ques-
tions based on the World Health Organisation’s (WHO)
definition of a health system as ‘all organisations, people
and actions whose primary intent is to promote, restore
or maintain health’ [10]. It used the WHO’s six building
blocks; service delivery; health workforce; information;
medical products, vaccines and technologies; financing;
and leadership and governance [10]. The roles of the
Israeli government and the medical profession were ex-
plored with respect to the strikers’ complaints as they re-
late to these six building block functions. Subsequent
lines of questioning developed according to emerging
themes. It should be noted that we were not seeking
consensus on the rights or wrongs of the strikes but ra-
ther to obtain information on the underlying problems in
the health system. The interviews were used to fill in gaps
not addressed adequately from the other sources and we
achieved saturation, suggesting that additional interviews
were unlikely to provide additional information.
The Israeli health system
The Israeli healthcare system has provided universal
coverage since the 1995 National Health Insurance Law
(NHIL) made it a requirement for all Israelis to join one
of four not-for-profit health plans (Sick Funds Clalit,
Maccabi, Leumit and Meuchedet) [6,11]. People can
move between these health plans. Each year the gov-
ernment determines the benefit package that the
health plans must provide. There is some variation
across regions and ethnic groups in terms of access
and quality of Israel’s health system, as is found in
most health systems, and it is recognised that these
need to be addressed. The state, through the Ministry
of Health, is ultimately responsible for health policy
and regulates the health system. The state also pro-
vides services not included in the insurance schemes,
such as maternal and child care, and owns about 50%
of acute hospital beds, thereby acting as a direct ser-
vice provider [6,11].
Privately financed health care
Since 1997, there has been a substantial increase in the
share of healthcare that is financed privately [1].
Chernicovsky and Regev [1] report that ‘the share of
public expenditure in the total national health expend-
iture has declined to the lowest level exhibited by those
developed countries that provide their residents with
universal health insurance – less than 60 percent in
2010’.
According to the Household Expenditure Survey [12]
the private financing, which accounts for roughly 40%
of total financing, is itself composed of the following:
private health Insurance (32%), dental care (26%), med-
ications (15%) and other (27%). As Chernichovsky and
Navon [13] note, the various components, and sub-
components, of private health expenditure vary sub-
stantially in the extent to which they address basic
needs which Israeli society might consider financing
publicly.
Physicians’ remuneration
Physicians pay is determined by the setting in which
they work, summarised in Table 2. In part due to defin-
itional problems, but also the informal nature of some
employment, as would apply equally to all countries
where the state is not a monopoly employer, the per-
centage of doctors working privately is not known. Offi-
cially, doctors can practice privately only in private
hospitals or in the Jerusalem voluntary hospitals, and
not in public hospitals. There are, however, doctors who,
in return for under the table payments will practice pri-
vately in public hospitals [6]. The extent of this practice
is unknown.
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Why did the strikes occur?
Whilst there were a number of factors contributing to
the 2011 physician strikes, most of those interviewed at-
tribute the principal cause to low wages. Many inter-
viewees reported that, despite their many years of
competitive and intensive training, doctors perceive
themselves to be relatively underpaid in comparison to
their equals in other countries and in other professions,
even following a general rise in their salaries over
the last decade. Furthermore, many Israeli physicians
complete international fellowships in countries where
doctors have higher salaries and a better standard of
living, which becomes their reference point on return
home. One interviewee reported that some doctors feel
cheated when they see the comparison; that ‘they give
so much to their country’s health system to get so little
in return’. Some Israeli doctors have supplemented
their wages through private work and believe that if the
government wants them to remain in the public sector,
not only should they be paid more, but that they should
see their pay increase as supplementary insurance up-
take increases. There is also demand to allow private
practice in public hospitals to facilitate higher earnings.
The message from our interviews was that the Israeli
government is however resistant to physicians’ de-
mands for higher pay in the fear that it would encour-
age other public sector workers to also insist on major
pay increases, feeling that it would not have been in a
position to respond, especially following the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis.
Whilst the current strikes may have been in part about
pay, doctors in many countries are unhappy or seek
higher payments yet do not strike [14]. Although some
of these countries have laws prohibiting physician
strikes, others do not and this strongly suggests that
there are some specific features of the Israeli health sys-
tem that require attention. However, we also note that,
even where strikes are illegal, they sometimes happen. A
more detailed legal analysis of a large number of coun-
tries, which would require contact with knowledgeable
key informants in each, is outside the scope of the
paper.
One of the slogans of the 2011 strikes was ‘save
our public health system’ and this was certainly a key
theme of the IMA campaign. Some physicians were
concerned with the increasing privatisation of the
health system, poor access in certain areas of the coun-
try, overcrowding in hospitals, a shortage of beds and
staff (especially in the peripheries and certain special-
ities), poor working conditions and insufficient re-
sources to deliver an effective health system, with a
general decrease in government health spending over
the years since the NHIL came into effect [1,15]. Some
commentators argue that, while a real concern, the ar-
gument for saving the public health system was actu-
ally a public relations stunt by doctors and the IMA to
make the real issue of higher wages more palatable to
the public. Yet, our interviews suggest that there were
certainly doctors who truly believed in it and saw it as
their primary concern.
Table 2 Summary of the remuneration of physicians in Israel
Setting Sub setting Remuneration
Primary care physicians Clinic based • A monthly salary, based on experience, list size and the number of hours worked
An additional monthly capitation payment for patient lists that are longer than a
prescribed number
• Additional special payments for certain activities
Independently based • Capitation basis
Community based specialists Salaried • Salary reflecting the number of hours worked, experience and rank
• Additional payments for seeing more “first-time” patients
Independent • Capitation basis
• Additional fee-for-service payments for some procedures
Hospital based doctors • Mainly salaried depending on responsibility and experience.
• Additional money through:
○ Private work in private hospitals or community settings- usually fee-for-service
○ Some voluntary hospitals in Jerusalem allow private services in public hospitals by
out of pocket, supplementary or commercial health insurance schemes and fee for
service.
○ Working for established health trusts out of hours
○ Some accept illegal, under-the table payments
Source: Health System Review [6].
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The context of the strikes is also important. Strikes are
commonplace in Israel, considered a part of ‘Israeli
mentality’ especially amongst the medical profession.
According to four of those interviewed, some Israeli
doctors believe that striking is the only way to gain at-
tention and achieve their goals. During the resolution of
the 2000 strikes, a ten-year no-strike agreement was
made. As this period came to an end, physicians became
increasingly frustrated that little had changed and,
according to our interviewees, many doctors were just
waiting and willing for the chance to strike again. Many
doctors defended their right to strike whilst others
would argue that it is never ethical to do so.
Other contributing factors to the strikes include the
dual role of the IMA, which not only represents doctors
but also sees itself as an advocate for the public and for
the health system. Normally these dual roles of the IMA
coincide, but not always. For example, in the recent ne-
gotiations, the IMA's push to increase pay for doctors in
the remote parts of the country due to an interest in im-
proving health in the periphery, may have prevented a
larger pay increase for doctors in general. Some doctors
therefore felt betrayed by the IMA leading to rifts within
the association [1]. They saw the IMA as hiding behind
a socialist flag, failing to prioritise their main role, which
they saw as representing doctors, their salaries and
pensions.
It is also important to consider that the 2011 strikes
actually comprised two elements; an initial strike, follow-
ing which the agreement was signed between the IMA
and the Government, and a secondary wave of resigna-
tions by young doctors in the centre of the country who
did not benefit significantly from the first agreement but
who were unable to strike as this would have been illegal
once the first strikes terminated. These younger resi-
dents felt unheard and unrepresented. They were en-
couraged by senior doctors working in the centre of the
country, who also felt betrayed by the initial agreement,
to resign due to the perception that most of the pay in-
creases that followed the strikes went to doctors working
in the periphery of the country, designed to encourage
people to work there. Furthermore it should be noted
that whilst the bonuses for work in the periphery or dis-
tressed specialties were very significant for those physi-
cians who received the bonuses, overall they account for
only a very small fraction of the total incremental cost of
the new wage agreement see also [16]. Those threaten-
ing to resign had been hoping for a substantial bonus for
full time public work or for legitimisation of private
work in the public hospitals. According to some of those
interviewed, those involved in this secondary wave ap-
pear to have been less concerned with the overall good
of the public health system than the broader group of
doctors involved in the first wave of strikes [17].
Cracks within the health system?
In the previous section, we reviewed some of the pos-
sible reasons for the strikes. The key question that we
are asking is whether the strike also reflects underlying
problems with the health system. This was the view
expressed by many of the protestors, many of whom dir-
ectly attacked the health system, the government and
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in particular who,
unusually, combined this post with that of Health Minis-
ter. They chanted “Knesset (parliament), wake up, the
health care system is crumbling [18]”. The IMA, in a
position paper, explicitly framed the strikes as a mission
to ‘improve the welfare of patients and protect the pub-
lic healthcare system [4,19]’ while Leonid Eidelman,
chair of the IMA said “the health system is collapsing
[20]”. One leading academic commentator, Dov
Chernichovsky, Chair of the Taub Centre Health Policy
Programme, argued that “the strike reveals the depth
of the structural crisis that has emerged within the
healthcare system [21]”.
It is imperative however, to ensure that there is no
confounding between slogans and the strikes' genuine
objectives, as well as between the strikers' perceptions
and the reality of Israeli health care. To assess whether
the strikers' claims do amount to evidence of emerging
cracks within the system we return to the WHO build-
ing blocks and the definition of the goals of a health sys-
tem; to improve ‘health and health equity in ways that
are responsive, financially fair and make the best or most
efficient use of available resources ([10], p2)’. If there are
emerging cracks, then the Israeli health system will not
be achieving these goals, and the demands of the strikers
should resonate with a fault within one or more of
WHO’s six building blocks. Here we look at the six
building blocks as the core structure of a health system,
not to analyse systematically Israel’s health care system
against each of them in their entirety, but to assess
whether the strikers demands resonate with any of them
individually.
Faults in the health system building blocks as identified
by the strikers
Health workforce
Shortage of healthcare professionals There is increas-
ing concern about a projected overall shortage of doc-
tors, nurses and hospital beds as well as significant
imbalances impacting adversely on remote areas and un-
popular specialties [21] and this was a key message
highlighted by those striking [22]. A shortage of doctors
is something that few would have predicted a decade
ago, when Israel was the destination for large numbers
of doctors from Eastern Europe. However, the existing
medical schools have not expanded to keep pace with
the growing population and the supply of eastern
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European doctors has dried up. Reduced prestige of the
medical profession in Israel, emigration of doctors, inad-
equate salaries, and burnout have also been cited as rea-
sons for the projected shortage [22]. Other cited reasons
include migration of the Israel public and physicians to
the private system [1], internal ‘brain drain’ as well as a
problem of geographic maldistribution of doctors ra-
ther than a doctor shortage per se. It should be noted,
however that there is still no shortage of Israelis apply-
ing to medical schools, which are generally heavily
oversubscribed, with entry remaining extremely com-
petitive, and medicine remains one of the most popular
courses of study when measured as the ratio of appli-
cants to places [23]. The government is expanding
training capacity, most notably with a new medical
school that opened in Galilee in October 2011, but one
interviewee noted that this will take some time to im-
pact on the medical workforce and staff shortages are
projected to ‘get worse before they get better’. There is
no specific body with responsibility for workforce pro-
jection and planning but ad hoc committees are set up
to address this problem when needed [6].
It is, however, necessary to place the perceived shortage
of doctors in an international context. The ratio of doc-
tors to population is still higher than in many other
countries (Figure 1). In 2010, it was estimated that the
number of practising physicians for every thousand
people was 3.5, although this figure fell to 3.0 in 2011
(with the sharp drop perhaps attributable to sampling
errors). This compares with 2.4 in America and 3.1 in
Organisation for Economic and Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries as a whole [1]. However,
some other countries have overtaken Israel.
It is also important to note that the number of health
professionals per 1,000 population varies considerably
according to region [1], with almost half as many health
care professionals per 1,000 population in the periphery
(North and South) compared with Tel-Aviv, as illustrated
in Figure 2.
According to Chernicovsky and Regev [1] however, the
‘serious problem for which no reliable data exist is that
of the siphoning of the physician manpower, particularly
specialists, out of the public system and into the private
market, and a consequent worsening of the relative
shortage of physicians (especially specialists) in the pub-
lic system’.
Workforce morale
Another concern is morale in the workforce; there is
widespread agreement that this is low amongst Israeli
doctors and that it has played a part in the genesis of
the strikes. It is attributed to inadequate occupational
pensions, long hours and what many perceive to be low
pay, as discussed above. The OECD has compared the
earnings of salaried doctors and nurses around the world
and with all workers with tertiary education in twelve
countries including Israel. They found that, in 2008, Is-
raeli doctors and nurses had close to the average com-
pensation of health professionals in other countries. In
addition, Israeli specialists are paid over 2.2 times what
university graduates earn in other sectors of the Israeli
economy, with the figure for general practitioners about
1.4 times, both of which compare favourably with figures
from other OECD countries [26].
Workforce morale deteriorated during the strike nego-
tiations when it was proposed that doctors should ‘clock
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in and out’. From the government’s point of view this
would prevent physicians from leaving the public set-
tings in the early afternoon to pursue private work in
private hospitals, a practice that has increased a great
deal over the last 5–10 years, and would also allow doc-
tors to be paid overtime. Many doctors felt it would
undermine their professional integrity and, according to
the chair of the IMA Ethics Bureau, would lead to “a
culture of doing only what you have to” [20] thereby sim-
ply legitimising the behaviour of those leaving early to
practice privately. For many doctors the ‘clock in clock
out’ was an emotional issue, a ‘red flag’ that they felt
undermined their professionalism leaving doctors ‘deeply
insulted to the point of outrage by the doubts cast on
their integrity’ [27].
Some doctors suggested a solution whereby doctors
could practice privately in public hospitals thereby
supplementing their income without cost to the govern-
ment and allowing them to remain in the public setting.
The government, however, made it clear that it was not
going to negotiate private practice in public hospitals for
two reasons: economically- if physicians practiced pri-
vately in public hospitals there would be increased
demand, increased activity and increased health expend-
iture with no increase in the health level of the popula-
tion; and on grounds of equity - the government wanted
to prevent a two tier system of health that could also ex-
tend to other sectors such as education.
Service delivery
In general, the performance of the Israeli health system is
accepted to be good [23]. For example, waiting times for
community-based doctors are short overall, but there are
some widely recognised concerns, such as inaccessibility,
adequacy of medical explanations, cultural responsiveness
and bedside manner that are problematic. There are also
issues of inequality, overcrowding, an inability to keep up
with changing health needs -for example as a consequence
of an aging population- and insufficient hospital beds with
too few medical personnel [1,6,15,21,28]. In 2010 the ratio
of hospital beds per thousand people in Israel was 3.3
compared with an OECD average of 4.9 [24]. A key com-
plaint by strikers was the insufficient time doctors in the
community are allocated for each clinic consultation. Dur-
ing the latest strikes the IMA also tried, as outlined above,
to solve the issues surrounding the poorer level of care in
peripheral parts of the country and the low number of
doctors working in some specialties [2,4,6,20]. Interest-
ingly, despite the claims of system failure, as noted above,
the strikers did not focus to any significant extent on some
of the known problems with the Israeli health system,
such as the exclusion of long-term, dental and mental
health care from the health plans [6], that ‘opportunities
for engaging in screening and health promotion are quite
limited’ ([6] p198), and longstanding concerns about in-
equity, affecting in particular elderly people, immigrants,
Israel’s Arab minority and the poor [6]. Notably, these is-
sues did feature more prominently in previous strikes by
Israeli doctors.
Financing
Many strikers saw the cause of the current problems as
inadequate health care financing and to some extent,
challenges to equity. Historically, financing of the Israeli
health system has been relatively equitable, especially
since the implementation in 1995 of the health insur-
ance law, but this has been somewhat eroded by privat-
isation and commercialisation of aspects of the health
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system that is arguably moving towards an American
system of care. In 2009, Israel spent 7.9% of its GDP on
health, compared to the OECD average of 9.5%, with a
total expenditure on health of US$2,071 per capita
(expressed as purchasing power parity) in 2010, com-
pared with an OECD average of US$2,754. Although this
figure is slightly higher than in 1995 (7.4%), the share of
public funding dropped from about 70% in 1995 to 60%
in 2010, (the OECD average is 71.7%) [21,24] and, as is
discussed above, about 80% of the public now have sup-
plementary insurance. There are two views on this; one,
that the share of public funding has decreased simply
as a consequence of changing expectations leading to
increased private spending, and the other, that the in-
creased private spending has been necessary to com-
pensate for decreased public spending, with increased
co-payments and supplemental insurance [6,21]. As the
private system strengthens, the public system gets
weaker leading to a widening of inequalities and the
threat of a two-tier system. As the Opposition leader at
the time, Tzipi Livni, argued during the strikes, there
are “two medical systems, one for the rich and one for
the poor [20]”. Although people can, in theory, chose
whether or not to purchase private insurance, the fact
that 80% of people do so is a strong indicator that the
system is failing to meet all of the public's wishes and
perceived needs [6].
Leadership and governance
There are many different loci of leadership in the Israeli
health system that include: the government as a whole,
the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance, hospital
directors, health fund directors, heads of academic com-
munities, and the IMA. Here we will focus on health
leadership by the government. Leadership is about ‘over-
seeing and guiding the whole health system ([10] p23)’.
Good leadership should take the health system forward.
The NHIL is widely seen as having been a great achieve-
ment, but, since then, progress has been perceived by
some to have stagnated [29] with some academics calling
for ‘refreshment and policy amendments that will cor-
respond to its original aspirations’ ([30], p273). Some be-
lieve that the Israeli health system lacks leadership,
which is manifest in the examples of poor planning for
staff shortages and unequal access documented above.
For example, one member of the Knesset demanded that
the Prime Minister “stop hiding behind representatives
of the Treasury and Health Ministry and show real lead-
ership [31]”. This may reflect frustration with a failure to
reach agreement after eight months of unresolved
negotiations.
Two other important factors preventing strong leader-
ship are that the Ministry of Health is both a regulator,
employer and provider of health services, leading to
conflicts of interest [6] and that two ministries are in-
volved with healthcare; both the Ministry of Health and
the Ministry of Finance, which are not always on the
same side. The multiple voices of the government com-
plicate the situation, although it should be noted that
these factors are not unique to the health ministry and
are true of other social ministries. Crucially, the Ministry
of Health is weaker than the Ministry of Finance, for
several reasons; firstly, the structure of government in
Israel that deliberately gives greater power to the Minis-
try of Finance; secondly, the Ministry of Health is both a
regulator and provider of services; and finally, funding is
controlled by the Ministry of Finance so the Health Min-
istry has to compete for finances in a country where
health is still a relatively low priority [32,33]. Interest-
ingly, when the NHIL was introduced, this was a rare
time when the Ministry of Health, despite objections
from the Ministry of Finance, was strong enough to im-
plement a major health policy change.
There are however others, including some of those we
interviewed, who argue that leadership of the Israeli
health system is very good, perhaps even more proactive
than it has ever been. Indeed there have been many
major reforms recently, for example with respect to ex-
pansion of the benefits package and health equity; new
reforms in the organisation of mental health services,
the elimination of co-payments for mother and child
and securing greater funds overall for the health system.
Other changes include new legislation that makes it eas-
ier for those studying medicine abroad to get a licence
to work in Israel and a major new initiative on health
promotion and laws to limit smoking in public places.
How can these two views be reconciled? It could be
that, in general, leadership of the Israeli health system is
strong, but that the lack of leadership lies in managing
and dealing with the physicians’ frustrations, particularly
with their incomes, during each wave of strikes. In par-
ticular, one interviewer highlighted that a criticism com-
ing out of the strikes is that the leadership did not listen
to the residents who felt unheard and who should have
been involved with negotiations from the beginning.
Information
Information includes the generation and dissemination
of information about health system performance [10].
Whilst there have been many conferences and high level
discussions on the strikes, regular news coverage, as well
as closer analysis in the Hebrew literature, to an outside
observer it is surprising how little in depth analysis there
has been so far of the latest strikes in the academic or
professional press. In particular, there has been little on
the specific issues of physician incomes, their determi-
nants and their implications. Many of those interviewed
agreed that there was not as much as there could, or
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should have been. Similarly, although there is commen-
tary in the mass media (in English and in Hebrew), there
is very little published academic analysis of many of the
previous strikes. Without critique and analysis, a system
cannot learn.
Further analysis should not come only from a medical
and health policy point of view but also from the per-
spective of sociologists and historians. One interviewee
highlighted a number of broader social changes challen-
ging the health workforce, including a change in work
ethic, which some have attributed to an increased em-
phasis on work-life balance, affecting both genders, and
this is something that others have noted [27]. Changing
expectations may have contributed to the 2011 strikes,
although this is something that should be explored in
further research.
Medical products, vaccines and technologies
This is the only aspect not identified by the strikers dur-
ing this wave of strikes as problematic, and is one of
Israel’s strengths [6], although there is always some gen-
eral frustrations as to what goes into the benefit package
but this will always be difficult when prioritisation must
occur. It has also been suggested that there is scope for
technological developments to compensate for staff
shortages [21].
Outcome of the strikes
There were several positive outcomes from the strikes.
These included an increase in government sponsored
medical positions and increased resources and staff for
the peripheral parts of the country. According to some
interviewees, this improvement in health equity was one
of the most successful outcomes of the strikes and
something that had never been emphasised before. How-
ever, all interviewees agreed that many issues remain
outstanding.
According to the IMA [34], only a year after the latest
set of negotiations many doctors remain unhappy, even
with an average salary increase of 12.1%. Doctors com-
plain that there are still shortages of physicians in some
specialties, shortages during weekend shifts and there is
persistent disgruntlement about the new requirement of
clocking in and out [34]. Furthermore, as we have
already discussed, many of the doctors in the centre of
the country felt left out of negotiations as most of the
salary increases made at the end of the strike were for
doctors in the periphery of the country, as an incentive
for doctors to work there.
Disunity was also created between some of the senior
and junior doctors with the more junior doctors feeling
that the IMA had neglected their needs leading to div-
ision between the junior doctors and the IMA leadership
[1]. However, as we saw above, some of the senior
doctors had encouraged the resignations and threats of
the junior doctors, to seek changes relevant to them-
selves rather than the residents, such as private practice
rights and full-timer bonuses. Some doctors felt that the
strikes were a battle between them and the Ministry of
Finance and that ultimately the treasury had won on
every account, humiliating the doctors and preventing
them from further strikes for another ten years.
According to one interviewee, the agreements following
the strikes had actually made things worse. As a result
of some of these problems, a new doctors’ organisation
was set up called "Arbel", ‘consisting largely of younger
doctors in the centre of the country’ or ‘renegade physi-
cians that opposed the Israel Medical Organization’s pol-
icies in reaching an agreement with the Finance Ministry
[35]’ causing further splintering amongst the profession.
Another group involved was Mirsham (Medical Resi-
dents Working to Improve Israeli Medicine) which
‘sought to represent Israel’s younger resident physicians
who it was claimed were paying the price of the public
systems inadequacies [1]. Importantly, where doctors re-
main dissatisfied, there is a danger of further strikes.
Chernichovsky and Regev [1] argue that ‘it is highly
doubtful whether the strike helped resolve any structural
issues within the system, or whether it indeed saved Is-
raeli public medicine, as the strike’s organizers originally
intended….it appears mainly to have resolved certain
point-specific issues within the system, rather than the
fundamental problems: the declining share of public in-
vestment in the healthcare system, the lack of a long-
term plan, and the private system’s growing share at the
public system’s expense – a situation liable to worsen
existing inequities and to impair the public system’s ef-
fectiveness’. This changing public-private mix of finan-
cing of the health system is a key problem with the
health system that needs to be addressed, as highlighted
recently by the Trachtenberg committee, a public com-
mittee for socio-economic change, appointed by Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in August 2011.
Conclusion
Contrary to the view held among some sections of Israeli
society, strikes by physicians in the rest of the world are
neither commonplace nor inevitable. Strikes should not
be accepted as something that is simply part of Israeli
medical culture; rather, the root causes should be care-
fully analysed and identified so that the system can move
forward. The 2011 strikes were caused by a complex
interaction of factors; it was largely due to dissatisfaction
with salaries and working conditions, and disagreements
regarding the public health system, but it was also in
part a result of differences in interests, values and per-
ceptions of reality between the Ministries of Health and
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Finance and the physicians. But do the strikes also re-
flect underlying problems within the health system?
It is important to remember that while most organised
health systems offering universal coverage are hardly 100
years old [6], the introduction of the NHIL in 1995
makes Israel’s one of the newest; a teenager at 18 years.
The NHIL was an achievement and has attained a high
standard of care [6,28] that the majority of Israelis are
happy with [21], the service is universal, there is an im-
pressive basket of services, short waiting times and a
high standard of medical training. In addition there is a
good level of new technology and medications, the dis-
tribution of services is relatively equal, quality assurance
mechanisms are in place [36,37], and satisfaction is gen-
erally high [15]. Furthermore, population health is gener-
ally good and the strikes were by no means a response
to a health ‘crisis’.
However, if the goal of a health system is to improve
‘health equity in ways that are responsive, financially fair
and make the best or most efficient use of available re-
sources’ ([10] p2), then the analysis presented here sug-
gests that strikes reflect cracks in the health system. The
system is not as responsive as it might be; whilst it does
deal with patients quickly when needed, the strikes still
occurred despite eight months of negotiations. Although
providing universal coverage, there is growing inequity,
with co-payments and supplementary insurance playing
a major role [38]. The system does not always make effi-
cient use of resources as seen by staff shortages and lim-
ited hospital capacity. We have also seen, of the WHO’s
six building blocks, weaknesses in five of them do
resonate on some level with strikers demands. Further-
more, others argue that there are emerging cracks in the
health system that were not even touched upon by the
strikers. But what is the extent of these cracks?
Of the six WHO building blocks, three are most im-
portant in the present context. The first is ‘health work-
force’. Dissatisfaction with salaries and conditions
appears to be the main reason for the strikes; the
workers feel that they are not listened to, and this is a
complaint repeated with each set of strikes, including
the latest strikes. Interestingly the 2000 and 2011 strikers
made very similar demands [6] but these were not re-
solved in 2000 causing doctors to remain unsatisfied.
This leads to the second key building block; leadership.
This is most apparent in the inadequate management of
physicians’ frustrations and complaints about their in-
comes. The third key building block is information. As
this review has shown, while there are many opinions,
there is a lack of in-depth rigorous analysis and critique
of the strikes and their underlying causes. These three
issues go hand-in-hand; whilst there is dissatisfaction
amongst the workforce, only with careful understanding
and analysis of the cause of the strikes can those at the
top respond appropriately to these complaints and frus-
trations to lead the health system forward effectively.
As noted above, while strikes by physicians in other
countries are rare, Israel is not unique. In this paper we
have treated the Israeli strikes in the same way that hos-
pital management might view a series of medical errors,
as a critical event that, ideally, should not happen where
a more detailed inquiry may reveal underlying systemic
problems [39]. It seems reasonable to subject physician
strikes in other countries to similar scrutiny. However,
as with the Israeli strikes, only a very few published
studies have done so [40,41], with most instead looking
at issues such as the characteristics of strikers or the im-
pact on the delivery of care or health outcomes [42-49].
In conclusion, while the strikes may be, in part, a re-
flection of cracks within the health system, many of
these issues can be overcome. They should be seen as
the teething problems of what is a relatively new, and
still popular, health system that is still struggling with
adolescence and looking for guidance as to where to
go next.
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